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Interpersonal trust is an essential ingredient of many social relationships but how stable is
it actually, and how is it controlled? There is evidence that the degree of trust into others
might be rather volatile and can be affected by manipulations like drawing attention to
personal interdependence or independence. Here we investigated whether the degree
of interpersonal trust can be biased by inducing either a more integrative or a more
focused/exclusive cognitive control mode by means of a creativity task requiring divergent
or convergent thinking, respectively. Participants then performed the trust game, which
provides an index of interpersonal trust by assessing the money units one participant (the
trustor) transfers to another (the trustee). As expected, trustors transferred signiﬁcantly
more money to trustees after engaging in divergent thinking as compared to convergent
thinking.This observation provides support for the idea that interpersonal trust is controlled
by domain-general (i.e., not socially dedicated) cognitive states.
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INTRODUCTION
Increasing evidence suggests that the degree to which people trust
others can vary. First, evidence for inter-individual variability
comes from intercultural and religious studies, which revealed
that interpersonal trust is stronger in collectivistic cultures than
in individualistic cultures that emphasize the independence of
self and other (for an overview see Buchan et al., 2002). Second,
the degree of interpersonal trust is sensitive to situational fac-
tors, such as self-construal tendencies. For example, drawing
participants’ attention to either personal interdependence (e.g.,
by instructing them to circle all relational pronouns in a text, such
as “we,” “our,” and “us”) or independence (by having them to
circle pronouns such as “I,” “my,” and “me”) has been demon-
strated to modulate the degree of interpersonal trust (Maddux
and Brewer, 2005), increasing and decreasing the effect, respec-
tively. Third, positive mood and the neuropeptide oxytocin seem
to boost the degree to which people trust others (Capra, 2004;
Kosfeld et al., 2005). Interestingly, recent studies have shown that
the effects of oxytocin in the social domain are conﬁned by fea-
tures of situations and characteristics of individuals (Bartz et al.,
2011). For instance, Tops et al. (2013) reported trust scores to
increase with salivary oxytocin levels under conditions of social
novelty but to decrease with such levels under conditions of
social familiarity. Finally, Colzato et al. (2013a) demonstrated
that interpersonal trust can be enhanced by administering the
food supplement L-tryptophan, the biochemical precursor of
serotonin.
Taken together, these results indicate that interpersonal trust
is a rather volatile, dynamic state that adjusts to the situation
at hand. In other words, the degree to which one individual
trusts another does not seem to reﬂect just a trait or some
overlearned cultural bias but, rather, a particular state (or set
of states) of the cognitive system. If so, it must be possible
to control one’s degree of interpersonal trust—be it directly
(by means of an explicit decision) or indirectly (by engag-
ing in some mental activity that is associated with a cognitive
state affecting trust, as in the study of Maddux and Brewer,
2005). In the present study, we focused on the latter, more
indirect kind of control by inducing particular (non-social) cog-
nitive control states1 or control styles by means of creativity
tasks.
As we have demonstrated elsewhere, tasks tapping into conver-
gent thinking are associated with (i.e., are likely to induce) a sort
of “exclusive” thinking while tasks tapping into divergent think-
ing are associated with a more “inclusive/integrative” thinking
style (Fischer and Hommel, 2012; Hommel, 2012). Interestingly
for our purposes, adopting such thinking styles affects the pro-
cessing of social information in systematic ways. As reported
by Colzato et al. (2013b), people are more likely to relate their
own actions to that of a co-actor in the context of a diver-
gent thinking task than in the context of a convergent thinking
task. This suggests that divergent thinking requires or tends to
establish a cognitive control state that promotes self-other inte-
gration. Also of interest, the same effect (i.e., more self-other
integration) can be achieved by drawing participants’ attention
to personal interdependence by having them to circle relational
pronouns in a text (Colzato et al., 2012a). The observation that
this latter manipulation also increases mutual trust (Maddux
and Brewer, 2005) suggests that divergent thinking and attend-
ing to personal interdependence tend to induce the same cognitive
control state, which again would predict that engaging in diver-
gent thinking should promote interpersonal trust. To be more
speciﬁc, interpersonal trust should be more pronounced after
1Cognitive control is commonly deﬁned as the ability to regulate one’s attention,
thought, and behavior (e.g., Monsell, 1996). Along these lines, we deﬁne cognitive
control states as cognitive or neural states that, once established or activated, regulate
attention, thought, and behavior in particular ways.
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engaging in divergent thinking than after engaging in convergent
thinking2.
We tested this prediction by having participants perform a
behavioral trust game (Camerer and Weigelt, 1988), a task widely
used in behavioral economics to measure interpersonal trust,
after having them perform either a convergent thinking task or
a divergent thinking task. Like Fischer and Hommel (2012),
we used Mednick’s (1962) Remote Associates Task (RAT) to
induce convergent thinking and Guilford’s (1967) Alternate Uses
Task (AUT) to induce divergent thinking. Convergent think-
ing is considered to occur “when cognition is used to identify
one correct or conventional answer” (Kozbelt et al., 2010, p. 32).
Accordingly, the RAT confronts participants with three unrelated
words in each trial, such as “night,” “wrist,” and “stop,” and
requires them to report the one common associate (“watch”)3.
In contrast, divergent thinking is considered a process trig-
gering many new ideas in a context where more than one
solution is correct, such as with brainstorming (Guilford, 1950,
1967). Accordingly, in the AUT participants are presented with
a particular object, such as a bottle, and then asked to gener-
ate as many likely uses of this object as possible. If the RAT
induces a more exclusive control state while the AUT induces a
more integrative state, interpersonal trust should be more pro-
nounced after performing the AUT than after performing the
RAT.
Given that our experimental manipulation is targeting an
unobservable state, we were interested in measures that might be
diagnostic about the degree to which our manipulation actually
worked. Interestingly, engaging in convergent thinking induces
more negative mood and less pleasure than performing a brain-
storming task (Akbari Chermahini andHommel, 2012).Wewould
thus expect participants to experience less pleasure after the con-
vergent thinking task than after the divergent thinking task. To
check for that, we also assessed pleasure and arousal of our par-
ticipants, and we did so before and after the creativity task, and at
the end of the experimental session.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Forty healthy young adults, with a mean age of 20.0 years
(SD = 2.0, range 18–25; 4 males, 36 females), participated for
partial fulﬁllment of course credit or a ﬁnancial reward. Written
informed consent was obtained from all participants after a
2One might consider it useful to include a neutral control condition with no par-
ticular control state. However, this is difﬁcult to achieve for both theoretical and
practical reasons. Theoretically, it is difﬁcult to see how humans can be prevented
from adopting a particular control state, or to experimentally induce a state that is
neither integrative nor exclusive. Practically, students being tested in an academic
setting are very likely to be biased toward convergent thinking—the thinking style
they are taught to adopt and practice on a daily basis—which is likely to account
for the frequent ﬁnding that divergent thinking interventions have stronger effects
than convergent thinking interventions (e.g., Colzato et al., 2012b).
3Note that there is no task that might be considered to provide a pure measure of
convergent or divergent thinking, so that each of the two tasks we were using has
convergent and divergent aspects to it. Nevertheless, it seems clear that the RAT
relies more on convergent than on divergent thinking, while the opposite is true for
the AUT. Moreover, performance in these two tasks is commonly uncorrelated and
differentially affected by further manipulations (Akbari Chermahini and Hommel,
2010), suggesting that the processing overlap is not substantial.
detailed explanation of the study procedures. The protocol was
approved by the local ethical committee (Faculty of Social and
Behavioral Sciences, Leiden University).
APPARATUS AND STIMULI
Remote Association Task (convergent thinking)
In this task, which we adopted fromColzato et al. (2012b), partici-
pants were presented with three words (such as cottage, swiss, and
cake) and were asked to ﬁnd a common associate (cheese). Our
Dutch version comprised of 15 items (Akbari Chermahini et al.,
2012), which were to be responded to within 10 min.
Alternate Uses Task (divergent thinking)
In this task, which we also adopted from Colzato et al. (2012b),
participants were asked to list as many possible uses for two com-
mon household items (pen, bottle) within 10 min. The results can
be scored in several ways with ﬂexibility, the number of different
categories used, often being the most consistent and reliable one
(Akbari Chermahini and Hommel, 2010).
Trust Game
The task assesses the extent to which one person (the trustor)
trusts another person (the trustee), as indicated by the number
of money units transferred from trustor to trustee (Camerer and
Weigelt,1988). Participantswere invited in (unacquainted)pairs to
emphasize the social-game aspect. After having been introduced to
each other by the experimenter, members of each pair were seated
in two separate cubicles and led to believe that one of them would
play the role of trustor and the other the role of trustee (in reality,
both of them were trustors). Trustors were endowed with €5 and
could decide how much of this amount to transfer to the trustee.
Transferred money would be multiplied by three, after which the
trustee could reciprocate by giving part of this tripled amount back
to the trustor. Thus, by transferring eurocents to the trustee, the
trustor could gain extra endowments, but only if the trustee would
give enough money back—which makes the amount transferred
by the trustor an indicator of interpersonal trust (Meijnders et al.,
2009).
PROCEDURE AND DESIGN
Convergent and divergent conditions were created by presenting
participants with one of the two paper and pencil creativity tasks
(a convergent thinking task and a divergent thinking task). Upon
arrival, participants were individually asked to rate their mood
on a 9 × 9 Pleasure × Arousal grid (Russell et al., 1989) with
values ranging from –4 to 4. Next, 20 participants were asked to
perform the RAT (based on Mednick, 1962, and translated into
Dutch) for 10 min to induce convergent thinking before rating
again their mood and completing the trust game. The other 20
participants carried out the AUT (Guilford, 1967) for 10 min
to induce divergent thinking before performing the trust game.
After having completed the trust game participants rated their
mood for the third time. Participants were told that the study
was about decision-making, but all of them were unaware of
the more speciﬁc purposes of the study and the hypothesis being
tested.
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STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
The data from all participants were considered in the analyses
and a signiﬁcance level of p < 0.05 was adopted for all tests.
A t-test for independent groups was performed to assess differ-
ences between the two groups (Convergent vs. Divergent) in the
amount of money transferred. Pleasure and arousal were analyzed
separately by means of two repeated-measures analyses of vari-
ances (ANOVAs) with effect of time (ﬁrst vs. second vs. third
measurement) as within-subjects factor and group (Convergent
vs. Divergent) as between-participants factor.
RESULTS
CREATIVITY TASKS
Performance was good and comparable to performance in similar
studies (e.g., Akbari Chermahini and Hommel, 2010). Partici-
pants produced about ﬁve correct responses on average in the RAT
(M = 4.9 and SD = 2.3) and used about six different categories in
the AUT (M = 6.4 and SD = 2.4).
TRUST GAME
As hypothesized, participants transferred signiﬁcantly more euros
to the trustee (the other participant of the couple) in the divergent
(3.47, SD = 1.33) than in the convergent group (2.60, SD = 1.31),
t(38) = 2.08, p < 0.05, d = 0.67.
MOOD
An ANOVA performed on the scores from the arousal scale
revealed no signiﬁcant main effect, F(2,76) = 1.28, p > 0.28, or
interaction between group and time, F(2,76) = 2.54, p > 0.08.
Arousal levels were thus comparable across group and time (−0.35
vs. 0.30 vs. 0.55 for participants in the convergent group and 1.05
vs. 0.75 vs. 0.95 for participants in the divergent group).
An ANOVA performed on the scores from pleasure scale
showed a signiﬁcant main effect of group, F(1,38) = 7.03,
p = 0.01, η2p = 0.16, reﬂecting higher pleasure in the diver-
gent group (1.43) than in the convergent group (0.43). Both
the main effect of time, F(2,76) = 4.08, p = 0.02, η2p = 0.10,
and the interaction, F(2,76) = 3.96, p = 0.02, η2p = 0.09, were
also signiﬁcant. Post hoc (Newman-Keuls) analyses showed that
pleasure levels were constant across the three measurements in
the divergent group (1.35 vs. 1.45 vs. 1.50, ps ≥ 0.70) but
dropped signiﬁcantly from the ﬁrst (0.60) to the second mea-
surement (−0.15; p = 0.006), and signiﬁcantly increased again
in the third measurement (0.85; p = 0.0009) in the convergent
group (the difference between ﬁrst and third measurement was
not signiﬁcant, p = 0.34). The interaction was thus driven by par-
ticularly bad mood (i.e., lower pleasure) after having performed
the divergent thinking task, which replicates the ﬁndings of Akbari
Chermahini and Hommel (2012) and was further conﬁrmed by
the fact that the two groups differed at the second measurement
only (p = 0.004).
To rule out the possible inﬂuence of pleasure levels in mediat-
ing the observed relationship between the degree of interpersonal
trust and the induced cognitive control state, Pearson correlation
coefﬁcients were computed between the amount of money trans-
ferred and the levels of pleasure at the second measurement and
the change in pleasure between the ﬁrst and secondmeasurement,
separately for the two groups. No signiﬁcant correlation was
found, ps ≥ 0.17.
DISCUSSION
As expected, interpersonal trust was more pronounced in the
Divergent than in the Convergent group. This suggests that the
two creativity tasks established different control states, which again
had a different impact on the degree to which participants trusted
others. These ﬁndings provide support for the idea that interper-
sonal trust is a volatile state that is under some degree of cognitive
control. Even though there is no reason to assume that our par-
ticipants exerted intentional control of the degree of trust they
executed, the control states that wemanaged to establish bymeans
of the creativity priming tasks turned out to be effective for the
participants’ degree of interpersonal trust. These observations are
in line with studies showing that interpersonal trust is sensitive to
various situational and environmental factors (Buchan et al., 2002;
Capra, 2004; Maddux and Brewer, 2005; Colzato et al., 2013a).
The fact thatwewere able tomodify interpersonal trust through
a logically unrelated task suggests that the degree of trusting each
other is controlled the same way as other cognitive operations are.
As we did not include a neutral condition (as this would be dif-
ﬁcult to conceptualize2), we are unable to determine whether the
impact of the two creativity tasks was symmetrical and compa-
rable in size. However, based on previous creativity studies (e.g.,
Colzato et al., 2012b) we suspect that having tested students in an
academic environment (which emphasizes convergent thinking)
might have rendered the divergent manipulation more effective.
In any case, however, the type of thinking seems to have a sys-
tematic impact on interpersonal trust. Although our sample was
not balanced with respect to gender, this cannot account for
the effect of divergent thinking on trust, because the four male
participants were evenly distributed across conditions. Neverthe-
less, future follow-up studies should include a more balanced
sample.
As expected, we observed that convergent thinking had a nega-
tive impact on mood. This replicates the previous observations of
Akbari Chermahini and Hommel (2012) and provides converging
evidence for our assumption that the two creativity tasks created
different cognitive states. Onemight be tempted to considermood
an alternative factor that was responsible for the observed trust
effect. However, although such an explanation would ﬁt with pre-
vious observations that trust can change as a function of mood
(Capra, 2004), it seems unlikely to apply to our data, as sug-
gested by the absence of any correlation between pleasure levels
and amount of money transferred.
Onemay wonder whether the trust game solely measures inter-
personal trust. After all, one may argue that the trustor simply has
a desire to increase his/her own gains, and – by transferringmoney
to the trustee – may be willing to take the risk to achieve this (see
e.g., Sapienza et al., 2007; Fehr, 2009). According to this reasoning,
the trust game may not (or not only) measure interpersonal trust,
but (also) the trustor’s risk attitude. However, Houser et al. (2010)
showed that people’s risk attitudes did predict behavior in indi-
vidual investment decisions, but not in the trust game. As Houser
et al. (2010) point out, these results favor the“trust” interpretation
of decisions in the trust game over the“risk-taking” interpretation.
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Even though our study did not include neurophysiological
measures, and thus cannot directly informabout the neural under-
pinnings of our effects, we would like to conclude by considering
theoretical connections to two recent neuroscientiﬁc approaches.
For one, Hecht (2014) has suggested that the right cortical hemi-
sphere has a relative advantage in mediating pro-social attitudes
and behaviors. Given the available evidence that the right hemi-
sphere is also specialized in holistic, integrated perception and
representation (Hellige, 1996; Christie et al., 2012), integrative
processing and the processing of trust-related information might
thus share cortical circuits—which againmight account formutual
priming effects of the sort suggested by our ﬁndings. For another,
there is a connection to the predictive and reactive control sys-
tems theory (PARCS) suggested by Tucker et al. (1995) and Tops’s
(2014; see also Tops et al., 2014) recent application of this the-
ory to the formation of social attachment and interpersonal trust.
According to Tops, oxytocin and serotonin facilitate the process
of shifting between different control states. Interestingly, one of
the postulated control states is considered to be more reactive
and assumed to promote local and convergent processing, while
another is more active/predictive and assumed to promote global
and divergent processing. Given that PARCS suggests associations
between trust to strangers and divergent thinking on the one hand
and between trust to in-group members and convergent thinking
on the other (cf., Tops, 2014), this conception would ﬁt with our
idea that convergent thinking and divergent thinking establish two
different cognitive control states and that the state associated with
divergent thinking promotes trust to unfamiliar others.
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